/****************************************************************************** * * Copyright 1999-2012 Broadcom Corporation * * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at: * * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 * * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and * limitations under the License. * *****************************************************************************/ /****************************************************************************** * * This file contains functions for the SMP L2CAP utility functions * ******************************************************************************/ #include "bt_target.h" #include #include #include "bt_types.h" #include "bt_utils.h" #include "btm_ble_api.h" #include "device/include/controller.h" #include "hcidefs.h" #include "l2c_api.h" #include "osi/include/log.h" #include "osi/include/osi.h" #include "smp_int.h" #include "stack/btm/btm_ble_int.h" #include "stack/include/acl_api.h" #include "stack/include/stack_metrics_logging.h" #define SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE 7 #define SMP_CONFIRM_CMD_SIZE (OCTET16_LEN + 1) #define SMP_RAND_CMD_SIZE (OCTET16_LEN + 1) #define SMP_INIT_CMD_SIZE (OCTET16_LEN + 1) #define SMP_ENC_INFO_SIZE (OCTET16_LEN + 1) #define SMP_CENTRAL_ID_SIZE (BT_OCTET8_LEN + 2 + 1) #define SMP_ID_INFO_SIZE (OCTET16_LEN + 1) #define SMP_ID_ADDR_SIZE (BD_ADDR_LEN + 1 + 1) #define SMP_SIGN_INFO_SIZE (OCTET16_LEN + 1) #define SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE 2 #define SMP_SECURITY_REQUEST_SIZE 2 #define SMP_PAIR_PUBL_KEY_SIZE (1 /* opcode */ + (2 * BT_OCTET32_LEN)) #define SMP_PAIR_COMMITM_SIZE (1 /* opcode */ + OCTET16_LEN /*Commitment*/) #define SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK_SIZE \ (1 /* opcode */ + OCTET16_LEN /*DHKey \ Check*/) #define SMP_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF_SIZE (1 /* opcode */ + 1 /*Notif Type*/) /* SMP command sizes per spec */ static const uint8_t smp_cmd_size_per_spec[] = { 0, SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE, /* 0x01: pairing request */ SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE, /* 0x02: pairing response */ SMP_CONFIRM_CMD_SIZE, /* 0x03: pairing confirm */ SMP_RAND_CMD_SIZE, /* 0x04: pairing random */ SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE, /* 0x05: pairing failed */ SMP_ENC_INFO_SIZE, /* 0x06: encryption information */ SMP_CENTRAL_ID_SIZE, /* 0x07: central identification */ SMP_ID_INFO_SIZE, /* 0x08: identity information */ SMP_ID_ADDR_SIZE, /* 0x09: identity address information */ SMP_SIGN_INFO_SIZE, /* 0x0A: signing information */ SMP_SECURITY_REQUEST_SIZE, /* 0x0B: security request */ SMP_PAIR_PUBL_KEY_SIZE, /* 0x0C: pairing public key */ SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK_SIZE, /* 0x0D: pairing dhkey check */ SMP_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF_SIZE, /* 0x0E: pairing keypress notification */ SMP_PAIR_COMMITM_SIZE /* 0x0F: pairing commitment */ }; static bool smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid(tSMP_CB* p_cb); static bool smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid(tSMP_CB* p_cb); /* type for SMP command length validation functions */ typedef bool (*tSMP_CMD_LEN_VALID)(tSMP_CB* p_cb); static bool smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length(tSMP_CB* p_cb); static const tSMP_CMD_LEN_VALID smp_cmd_len_is_valid[] = { smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid, smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x01: pairing request */ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x02: pairing response */ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x03: pairing confirm */ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x04: pairing random */ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x05: pairing failed */ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x06: encryption information */ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x07: central identification */ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x08: identity information */ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x09: identity address information */ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0A: signing information */ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0B: security request */ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0C: pairing public key */ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0D: pairing dhkey check */ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length, /* 0x0E: pairing keypress notification*/ smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length /* 0x0F: pairing commitment */ }; /* type for SMP command parameter ranges validation functions */ typedef bool (*tSMP_CMD_PARAM_RANGES_VALID)(tSMP_CB* p_cb); static bool smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid(tSMP_CB* p_cb); static bool smp_pairing_keypress_notification_is_valid(tSMP_CB* p_cb); static const tSMP_CMD_PARAM_RANGES_VALID smp_cmd_param_ranges_are_valid[] = { smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid, smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid, /* 0x01: pairing request */ smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid, /* 0x02: pairing response */ smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x03: pairing confirm */ smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x04: pairing random */ smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x05: pairing failed */ smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x06: encryption information */ smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x07: central identification */ smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x08: identity information */ smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x09: identity address information */ smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x0A: signing information */ smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x0B: security request */ smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x0C: pairing public key */ smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid, /* 0x0D: pairing dhkey check */ smp_pairing_keypress_notification_is_valid, /* 0x0E: pairing keypress notification */ smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid /* 0x0F: pairing commitment */ }; /* type for action functions */ typedef BT_HDR* (*tSMP_CMD_ACT)(uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_cmd(uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_confirm_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_rand_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_fail(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_identity_info_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_encrypt_info_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_security_request(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_signing_info_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_central_id_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_id_addr_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_pair_public_key_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_commitment_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_pair_dhkey_check_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_keypress_notification_cmd( UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb); static const tSMP_CMD_ACT smp_cmd_build_act[] = { NULL, smp_build_pairing_cmd, /* 0x01: pairing request */ smp_build_pairing_cmd, /* 0x02: pairing response */ smp_build_confirm_cmd, /* 0x03: pairing confirm */ smp_build_rand_cmd, /* 0x04: pairing random */ smp_build_pairing_fail, /* 0x05: pairing failure */ smp_build_encrypt_info_cmd, /* 0x06: encryption information */ smp_build_central_id_cmd, /* 0x07: central identification */ smp_build_identity_info_cmd, /* 0x08: identity information */ smp_build_id_addr_cmd, /* 0x09: identity address information */ smp_build_signing_info_cmd, /* 0x0A: signing information */ smp_build_security_request, /* 0x0B: security request */ smp_build_pair_public_key_cmd, /* 0x0C: pairing public key */ smp_build_pair_dhkey_check_cmd, /* 0x0D: pairing DHKey check */ smp_build_pairing_keypress_notification_cmd, /* 0x0E: pairing keypress notification */ smp_build_pairing_commitment_cmd /* 0x0F: pairing commitment */ }; static const tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_association_table[2][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX] = { /* display only */ /* Display Yes/No */ /* keyboard only */ /* No Input/Output */ /* keyboard display */ /* initiator */ /* model = tbl[peer_io_caps][loc_io_caps] */ /* Display Only */ {{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY}, /* Display Yes/No */ {SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY}, /* Keyboard only */ {SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF}, /* No Input No Output */ {SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY}, /* keyboard display */ {SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF}}, /* responder */ /* model = tbl[loc_io_caps][peer_io_caps] */ /* Display Only */ {{SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF}, /* Display Yes/No */ {SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF}, /* keyboard only */ {SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY}, /* No Input No Output */ {SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY}, /* keyboard display */ {SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY, SMP_MODEL_KEY_NOTIF, SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY, SMP_MODEL_PASSKEY}}}; static const tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_association_table_sc[2][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX][SMP_IO_CAP_MAX] = { /* display only */ /* Display Yes/No */ /* keyboard only */ /* No InputOutput */ /* keyboard display */ /* initiator */ /* model = tbl[peer_io_caps][loc_io_caps] */ /* Display Only */ {{SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT}, /* Display Yes/No */ {SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP}, /* keyboard only */ {SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP}, /* No Input No Output */ {SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS}, /* keyboard display */ {SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP}}, /* responder */ /* model = tbl[loc_io_caps][peer_io_caps] */ /* Display Only */ {{SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP}, /* Display Yes/No */ {SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP}, /* keyboard only */ {SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT}, /* No Input No Output */ {SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS}, /* keyboard display */ {SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_ENT, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_PASSKEY_DISP, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS, SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_NUM_COMP}}}; static tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_legacy_association_model(tSMP_CB* p_cb); static tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_association_model_secure_connections( tSMP_CB* p_cb); /** * Log metrics data for SMP command * * @param bd_addr current pairing address * @param is_outgoing whether this command is outgoing * @param p_buf buffer to the beginning of SMP command * @param buf_len length available to read for p_buf */ void smp_log_metrics(const RawAddress& bd_addr, bool is_outgoing, const uint8_t* p_buf, size_t buf_len) { if (buf_len < 1) { LOG(WARNING) << __func__ << ": buffer is too small, size is " << buf_len; return; } uint8_t cmd; STREAM_TO_UINT8(cmd, p_buf); buf_len--; uint8_t failure_reason = 0; if (cmd == SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_FAILED && buf_len >= 1) { STREAM_TO_UINT8(failure_reason, p_buf); } android::bluetooth::DirectionEnum direction = is_outgoing ? android::bluetooth::DirectionEnum::DIRECTION_OUTGOING : android::bluetooth::DirectionEnum::DIRECTION_INCOMING; log_smp_pairing_event(bd_addr, cmd, direction, failure_reason); } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_send_msg_to_L2CAP * * Description Send message to L2CAP. * ******************************************************************************/ bool smp_send_msg_to_L2CAP(const RawAddress& rem_bda, BT_HDR* p_toL2CAP) { uint16_t l2cap_ret; uint16_t fixed_cid = L2CAP_SMP_CID; if (smp_cb.smp_over_br) { fixed_cid = L2CAP_SMP_BR_CID; } SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); smp_log_metrics(rem_bda, true /* outgoing */, p_toL2CAP->data + p_toL2CAP->offset, p_toL2CAP->len); l2cap_ret = L2CA_SendFixedChnlData(fixed_cid, rem_bda, p_toL2CAP); if (l2cap_ret == L2CAP_DW_FAILED) { SMP_TRACE_ERROR("SMP failed to pass msg to L2CAP"); return false; } else { tSMP_CB* p_cb = &smp_cb; if (p_cb->wait_for_authorization_complete) { tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data; smp_int_data.status = SMP_SUCCESS; if (fixed_cid == L2CAP_SMP_CID) { smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data); } else { smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data); } } return true; } } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_send_cmd * * Description send a SMP command on L2CAP channel. * ******************************************************************************/ bool smp_send_cmd(uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { BT_HDR* p_buf; bool sent = false; LOG_DEBUG("Sending SMP command:%s[0x%x] pairing_bda=%s", smp_opcode_text(static_cast(cmd_code)).c_str(), cmd_code, PRIVATE_ADDRESS(p_cb->pairing_bda)); if (cmd_code <= (SMP_OPCODE_MAX + 1 /* for SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_COMMITM */) && smp_cmd_build_act[cmd_code] != NULL) { p_buf = (*smp_cmd_build_act[cmd_code])(cmd_code, p_cb); if (p_buf != NULL && smp_send_msg_to_L2CAP(p_cb->pairing_bda, p_buf)) { sent = true; alarm_set_on_mloop(p_cb->smp_rsp_timer_ent, SMP_WAIT_FOR_RSP_TIMEOUT_MS, smp_rsp_timeout, NULL); } } if (!sent) { tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data; smp_int_data.status = SMP_PAIR_INTERNAL_ERR; if (p_cb->smp_over_br) { smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data); } else { smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data); } } return sent; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_rsp_timeout * * Description Called when SMP wait for SMP command response timer expires * * Returns void * ******************************************************************************/ void smp_rsp_timeout(UNUSED_ATTR void* data) { tSMP_CB* p_cb = &smp_cb; SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s state:%d br_state:%d", __func__, p_cb->state, p_cb->br_state); tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data; smp_int_data.status = SMP_RSP_TIMEOUT; if (p_cb->smp_over_br) { smp_br_state_machine_event(p_cb, SMP_BR_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data); } else { smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data); } } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_delayed_auth_complete_timeout * * Description Called when no pairing failed command received within * timeout period. * * Returns void * ******************************************************************************/ void smp_delayed_auth_complete_timeout(UNUSED_ATTR void* data) { /* * Waited for potential pair failure. Send SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT if * the state is still in bond pending. */ if (smp_get_state() == SMP_STATE_BOND_PENDING) { SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s sending delayed auth complete.", __func__); tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data; smp_int_data.status = SMP_SUCCESS; smp_sm_event(&smp_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data); } } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_pairing_req_cmd * * Description Build pairing request command. * ******************************************************************************/ BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_cmd(uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, cmd_code); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->local_io_capability); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->loc_oob_flag); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->loc_auth_req); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->loc_enc_size); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->local_i_key); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->local_r_key); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; /* 1B ERR_RSP op code + 1B cmd_op_code + 2B handle + 1B status */ p_buf->len = SMP_PAIRING_REQ_SIZE; return p_buf; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_confirm_cmd * * Description Build confirm request command. * ******************************************************************************/ static BT_HDR* smp_build_confirm_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_CONFIRM_CMD_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_CONFIRM); ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->confirm, OCTET16_LEN); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_CONFIRM_CMD_SIZE; return p_buf; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_rand_cmd * * Description Build Random command. * ******************************************************************************/ static BT_HDR* smp_build_rand_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_RAND_CMD_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_RAND); ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->rand, OCTET16_LEN); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_RAND_CMD_SIZE; return p_buf; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_encrypt_info_cmd * * Description Build security information command. * ******************************************************************************/ static BT_HDR* smp_build_encrypt_info_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_ENC_INFO_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_ENCRYPT_INFO); ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->ltk, OCTET16_LEN); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_ENC_INFO_SIZE; return p_buf; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_central_id_cmd * * Description Build security information command. * ******************************************************************************/ static BT_HDR* smp_build_central_id_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_CENTRAL_ID_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_CENTRAL_ID); UINT16_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->ediv); ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->enc_rand, BT_OCTET8_LEN); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_CENTRAL_ID_SIZE; return p_buf; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_identity_info_cmd * * Description Build identity information command. * ******************************************************************************/ static BT_HDR* smp_build_identity_info_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, UNUSED_ATTR tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_ID_INFO_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; const Octet16& irk = BTM_GetDeviceIDRoot(); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_IDENTITY_INFO); ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, irk.data(), OCTET16_LEN); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_ID_INFO_SIZE; return p_buf; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_id_addr_cmd * * Description Build identity address information command. * ******************************************************************************/ static BT_HDR* smp_build_id_addr_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, UNUSED_ATTR tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_ID_ADDR_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_ID_ADDR); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, 0); BDADDR_TO_STREAM(p, *controller_get_interface()->get_address()); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_ID_ADDR_SIZE; return p_buf; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_signing_info_cmd * * Description Build signing information command. * ******************************************************************************/ static BT_HDR* smp_build_signing_info_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_SIGN_INFO_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_SIGN_INFO); ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->csrk, OCTET16_LEN); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_SIGN_INFO_SIZE; return p_buf; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_pairing_fail * * Description Build Pairing Fail command. * ******************************************************************************/ static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_fail(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_FAILED); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->failure); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE; return p_buf; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_security_request * * Description Build security request command. * ******************************************************************************/ static BT_HDR* smp_build_security_request(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + 2 + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_SEC_REQ); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->loc_auth_req); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_SECURITY_REQUEST_SIZE; SMP_TRACE_EVENT("opcode=%d auth_req=0x%x", SMP_OPCODE_SEC_REQ, p_cb->loc_auth_req); return p_buf; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_pair_public_key_cmd * * Description Build pairing public key command. * ******************************************************************************/ static BT_HDR* smp_build_pair_public_key_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; uint8_t publ_key[2 * BT_OCTET32_LEN]; uint8_t* p_publ_key = publ_key; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_PUBL_KEY_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); memcpy(p_publ_key, p_cb->loc_publ_key.x, BT_OCTET32_LEN); memcpy(p_publ_key + BT_OCTET32_LEN, p_cb->loc_publ_key.y, BT_OCTET32_LEN); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_PUBLIC_KEY); ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_publ_key, 2 * BT_OCTET32_LEN); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_PUBL_KEY_SIZE; return p_buf; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_pairing_commitment_cmd * * Description Build pairing commitment command. * ******************************************************************************/ static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_commitment_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_COMMITM_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_CONFIRM); ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->commitment, OCTET16_LEN); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_COMMITM_SIZE; return p_buf; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_pair_dhkey_check_cmd * * Description Build pairing DHKey check command. * ******************************************************************************/ static BT_HDR* smp_build_pair_dhkey_check_cmd(UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc( sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK); ARRAY_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->dhkey_check, OCTET16_LEN); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_DHKEY_CHECK_SIZE; return p_buf; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_build_pairing_keypress_notification_cmd * * Description Build keypress notification command. * ******************************************************************************/ static BT_HDR* smp_build_pairing_keypress_notification_cmd( UNUSED_ATTR uint8_t cmd_code, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc( sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, p_cb->local_keypress_notification); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_KEYPR_NOTIF_SIZE; return p_buf; } /** This function is called to convert a 6 to 16 digits numeric character string * into SMP TK. */ void smp_convert_string_to_tk(Octet16* tk, uint32_t passkey) { uint8_t* p = tk->data(); tSMP_KEY key; SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_convert_string_to_tk"); UINT32_TO_STREAM(p, passkey); key.key_type = SMP_KEY_TYPE_TK; key.p_data = tk->data(); tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data; smp_int_data.key = key; smp_sm_event(&smp_cb, SMP_KEY_READY_EVT, &smp_int_data); } /** This function is called to mask off the encryption key based on the maximum * encryption key size. */ void smp_mask_enc_key(uint8_t loc_enc_size, Octet16* p_data) { SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_mask_enc_key"); if (loc_enc_size < OCTET16_LEN) { for (; loc_enc_size < OCTET16_LEN; loc_enc_size++) (*p_data)[loc_enc_size] = 0; } return; } /** utility function to do an biteise exclusive-OR of two bit strings of the * length of OCTET16_LEN. Result is stored in first argument. */ void smp_xor_128(Octet16* a, const Octet16& b) { CHECK(a); uint8_t i, *aa = a->data(); const uint8_t* bb = b.data(); for (i = 0; i < OCTET16_LEN; i++) { aa[i] = aa[i] ^ bb[i]; } } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_cb_cleanup * * Description Clean up SMP control block * * Returns void * ******************************************************************************/ void smp_cb_cleanup(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { tSMP_CALLBACK* p_callback = p_cb->p_callback; uint8_t trace_level = p_cb->trace_level; alarm_t* smp_rsp_timer_ent = p_cb->smp_rsp_timer_ent; alarm_t* delayed_auth_timer_ent = p_cb->delayed_auth_timer_ent; SMP_TRACE_EVENT("smp_cb_cleanup"); alarm_cancel(p_cb->smp_rsp_timer_ent); alarm_cancel(p_cb->delayed_auth_timer_ent); memset(p_cb, 0, sizeof(tSMP_CB)); p_cb->p_callback = p_callback; p_cb->trace_level = trace_level; p_cb->smp_rsp_timer_ent = smp_rsp_timer_ent; p_cb->delayed_auth_timer_ent = delayed_auth_timer_ent; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_remove_fixed_channel * * Description This function is called to remove the fixed channel * * Returns void * ******************************************************************************/ void smp_remove_fixed_channel(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); if (p_cb->smp_over_br) L2CA_RemoveFixedChnl(L2CAP_SMP_BR_CID, p_cb->pairing_bda); else L2CA_RemoveFixedChnl(L2CAP_SMP_CID, p_cb->pairing_bda); } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_reset_control_value * * Description This function is called to reset the control block value * when the pairing procedure finished. * * * Returns void * ******************************************************************************/ void smp_reset_control_value(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); alarm_cancel(p_cb->smp_rsp_timer_ent); p_cb->flags = 0; /* set the link idle timer to drop the link when pairing is done usually service discovery will follow authentication complete, to avoid racing condition for a link down/up, set link idle timer to be SMP_LINK_TOUT_MIN to guarantee SMP key exchange */ L2CA_SetIdleTimeoutByBdAddr(p_cb->pairing_bda, SMP_LINK_TOUT_MIN, BT_TRANSPORT_LE); /* We can tell L2CAP to remove the fixed channel (if it has one) */ smp_remove_fixed_channel(p_cb); smp_cb_cleanup(p_cb); } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_proc_pairing_cmpl * * Description This function is called to process pairing complete * * * Returns void * ******************************************************************************/ void smp_proc_pairing_cmpl(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { tSMP_EVT_DATA evt_data = {0}; tSMP_CALLBACK* p_callback = p_cb->p_callback; evt_data.cmplt.reason = p_cb->status; evt_data.cmplt.smp_over_br = p_cb->smp_over_br; LOG_DEBUG( "Pairing process has completed to remote:%s reason:0x%0x sec_level=0x%0x", PRIVATE_ADDRESS(p_cb->pairing_bda), evt_data.cmplt.reason, evt_data.cmplt.sec_level); if (p_cb->status == SMP_SUCCESS) evt_data.cmplt.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level; evt_data.cmplt.is_pair_cancel = false; if (p_cb->is_pair_cancel) evt_data.cmplt.is_pair_cancel = true; RawAddress pairing_bda = p_cb->pairing_bda; smp_reset_control_value(p_cb); if (p_callback) (*p_callback)(SMP_COMPLT_EVT, pairing_bda, &evt_data); } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_command_has_invalid_length * * Description Checks if the received SMP command has invalid length * It returns true if the command has invalid length. * * Returns true if the command has invalid length, false otherwise. * ******************************************************************************/ bool smp_command_has_invalid_length(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t cmd_code = p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code; if ((cmd_code > (SMP_OPCODE_MAX + 1 /* for SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_COMMITM */)) || (cmd_code < SMP_OPCODE_MIN)) { SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Received command with RESERVED code 0x%02x", __func__, cmd_code); return true; } if (!smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length(p_cb)) { return true; } return false; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_command_has_invalid_parameters * * Description Checks if the received SMP command has invalid parameters * i.e. if the command length is valid and the command * parameters are inside specified range. * It returns true if the command has invalid parameters. * * Returns true if the command has invalid parameters, false otherwise. * ******************************************************************************/ bool smp_command_has_invalid_parameters(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t cmd_code = p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code; if ((cmd_code > (SMP_OPCODE_MAX + 1 /* for SMP_OPCODE_PAIR_COMMITM */)) || (cmd_code < SMP_OPCODE_MIN)) { SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Received command with RESERVED code 0x%02x", __func__, cmd_code); return true; } if (!(*smp_cmd_len_is_valid[cmd_code])(p_cb)) { SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Command length not valid for cmd_code 0x%02x", __func__, cmd_code); return true; } if (!(*smp_cmd_param_ranges_are_valid[cmd_code])(p_cb)) { SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Parameter ranges not valid code 0x%02x", __func__, cmd_code); return true; } return false; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length * * Description Checks if the received command size is equal to the size * according to specs. * * Returns true if the command size is as expected, false otherwise. * * Note The command is expected to have fixed length. ******************************************************************************/ bool smp_command_has_valid_fixed_length(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t cmd_code = p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s for cmd code 0x%02x", __func__, cmd_code); if (p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len != smp_cmd_size_per_spec[cmd_code]) { SMP_TRACE_WARNING( "Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with invalid length " "0x%02x (per spec the length is 0x%02x).", cmd_code, p_cb->rcvd_cmd_len, smp_cmd_size_per_spec[cmd_code]); return false; } return true; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid * * Description Validates parameter ranges in the received SMP command * pairing request or pairing response. * The parameters to validate: * IO capability, * OOB data flag, * Bonding_flags in AuthReq * Maximum encryption key size. * Returns false if at least one of these parameters is out of * range. * ******************************************************************************/ bool smp_pairing_request_response_parameters_are_valid(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t io_caps = p_cb->peer_io_caps; uint8_t oob_flag = p_cb->peer_oob_flag; uint8_t bond_flag = p_cb->peer_auth_req & 0x03; // 0x03 is gen bond with appropriate mask uint8_t enc_size = p_cb->peer_enc_size; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s for cmd code 0x%02x", __func__, p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code); if (io_caps >= BTM_IO_CAP_MAX) { SMP_TRACE_WARNING( "Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with IO Capability " "value (0x%02x) out of range).", p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, io_caps); return false; } if (!((oob_flag == SMP_OOB_NONE) || (oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT))) { SMP_TRACE_WARNING( "Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with OOB data flag value " "(0x%02x) out of range).", p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, oob_flag); return false; } if (!((bond_flag == SMP_AUTH_NO_BOND) || (bond_flag == SMP_AUTH_BOND))) { SMP_TRACE_WARNING( "Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Bonding_Flags value (0x%02x) " "out of range).", p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, bond_flag); return false; } if ((enc_size < SMP_ENCR_KEY_SIZE_MIN) || (enc_size > SMP_ENCR_KEY_SIZE_MAX)) { SMP_TRACE_WARNING( "Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Maximum Encryption " "Key value (0x%02x) out of range).", p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, enc_size); return false; } return true; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_pairing_keypress_notification_is_valid * * Description Validates Notification Type parameter range in the received * SMP command pairing keypress notification. * Returns false if this parameter is out of range. * ******************************************************************************/ bool smp_pairing_keypress_notification_is_valid(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { tSMP_SC_KEY_TYPE keypress_notification = p_cb->peer_keypress_notification; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s for cmd code 0x%02x", __func__, p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code); if (keypress_notification >= SMP_SC_KEY_OUT_OF_RANGE) { SMP_TRACE_WARNING( "Rcvd from the peer cmd 0x%02x with Pairing Keypress " "Notification value (0x%02x) out of range).", p_cb->rcvd_cmd_code, keypress_notification); return false; } return true; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid * * Description Always returns true. * ******************************************************************************/ bool smp_parameter_unconditionally_valid(UNUSED_ATTR tSMP_CB* p_cb) { return true; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid * * Description Always returns false. * ******************************************************************************/ bool smp_parameter_unconditionally_invalid(UNUSED_ATTR tSMP_CB* p_cb) { return false; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_reject_unexpected_pairing_command * * Description send pairing failure to an unexpected pairing command during * an active pairing process. * * Returns void * ******************************************************************************/ void smp_reject_unexpected_pairing_command(const RawAddress& bd_addr) { uint8_t* p; BT_HDR* p_buf = (BT_HDR*)osi_malloc(sizeof(BT_HDR) + SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET); SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); p = (uint8_t*)(p_buf + 1) + L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_OPCODE_PAIRING_FAILED); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, SMP_PAIR_NOT_SUPPORT); p_buf->offset = L2CAP_MIN_OFFSET; p_buf->len = SMP_PAIR_FAIL_SIZE; smp_send_msg_to_L2CAP(bd_addr, p_buf); } /******************************************************************************* * Function smp_select_association_model * * Description This function selects association model to use for STK * generation. Selection is based on both sides' io capability, * oob data flag and authentication request. * * Note If Secure Connections Only mode is required locally then we * come to this point only if both sides support Secure * Connections mode, i.e. * if p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required = true * then we come to this point only if * (p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) == * (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) == * SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT * ******************************************************************************/ tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_association_model(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { tSMP_ASSO_MODEL model = SMP_MODEL_OUT_OF_RANGE; p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used = false; SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __func__); SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->peer_io_caps = %d p_cb->local_io_capability = %d", __func__, p_cb->peer_io_caps, p_cb->local_io_capability); SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->peer_oob_flag = %d p_cb->loc_oob_flag = %d", __func__, p_cb->peer_oob_flag, p_cb->loc_oob_flag); SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s p_cb->peer_auth_req = 0x%02x p_cb->loc_auth_req = 0x%02x", __func__, p_cb->peer_auth_req, p_cb->loc_auth_req); SMP_TRACE_DEBUG( "%s p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required = %s", __func__, p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required ? "true" : "false"); if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) && (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT)) { p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used = true; } if ((p_cb->peer_auth_req & SMP_H7_SUPPORT_BIT) && (p_cb->loc_auth_req & SMP_H7_SUPPORT_BIT)) { p_cb->key_derivation_h7_used = TRUE; } SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("use_sc_process = %d, h7 use = %d", p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used, p_cb->key_derivation_h7_used); if (p_cb->le_secure_connections_mode_is_used) { model = smp_select_association_model_secure_connections(p_cb); } else { model = smp_select_legacy_association_model(p_cb); } return model; } /******************************************************************************* * Function smp_select_legacy_association_model * * Description This function is called to select association mode if at * least one side doesn't support secure connections. * ******************************************************************************/ tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_legacy_association_model(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { tSMP_ASSO_MODEL model = SMP_MODEL_OUT_OF_RANGE; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); /* if OOB data is present on both devices, then use OOB association model */ if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && p_cb->loc_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) return SMP_MODEL_OOB; /* else if neither device requires MITM, then use Just Works association model */ if (SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED(p_cb->peer_auth_req) && SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED(p_cb->loc_auth_req)) return SMP_MODEL_ENCRYPTION_ONLY; /* otherwise use IO capability to select association model */ if (p_cb->peer_io_caps < SMP_IO_CAP_MAX && p_cb->local_io_capability < SMP_IO_CAP_MAX) { if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_CENTRAL) { model = smp_association_table[p_cb->role][p_cb->peer_io_caps] [p_cb->local_io_capability]; } else { model = smp_association_table[p_cb->role][p_cb->local_io_capability] [p_cb->peer_io_caps]; } } return model; } /******************************************************************************* * Function smp_select_association_model_secure_connections * * Description This function is called to select association mode if both * sides support secure connections. * ******************************************************************************/ tSMP_ASSO_MODEL smp_select_association_model_secure_connections(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { tSMP_ASSO_MODEL model = SMP_MODEL_OUT_OF_RANGE; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); /* if OOB data is present on at least one device, then use OOB association * model */ if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT || p_cb->loc_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) return SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_OOB; /* else if neither device requires MITM, then use Just Works association model */ if (SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED(p_cb->peer_auth_req) && SMP_NO_MITM_REQUIRED(p_cb->loc_auth_req)) return SMP_MODEL_SEC_CONN_JUSTWORKS; /* otherwise use IO capability to select association model */ if (p_cb->peer_io_caps < SMP_IO_CAP_MAX && p_cb->local_io_capability < SMP_IO_CAP_MAX) { if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_CENTRAL) { model = smp_association_table_sc[p_cb->role][p_cb->peer_io_caps] [p_cb->local_io_capability]; } else { model = smp_association_table_sc[p_cb->role][p_cb->local_io_capability] [p_cb->peer_io_caps]; } } return model; } /******************************************************************************* * Function smp_calculate_random_input * * Description This function returns random input value to be used in * commitment calculation for SC passkey entry association mode * (if bit["round"] in "random" array == 1 then returns 0x81 * else returns 0x80). * * Returns ri value * ******************************************************************************/ uint8_t smp_calculate_random_input(uint8_t* random, uint8_t round) { uint8_t i = round / 8; uint8_t j = round % 8; uint8_t ri; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("random: 0x%02x, round: %d, i: %d, j: %d", random[i], round, i, j); ri = ((random[i] >> j) & 1) | 0x80; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s ri=0x%02x", __func__, ri); return ri; } /******************************************************************************* * Function smp_collect_local_io_capabilities * * Description This function puts into IOcap array local device * IOCapability, OOB data, AuthReq. * * Returns void * ******************************************************************************/ void smp_collect_local_io_capabilities(uint8_t* iocap, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); iocap[0] = p_cb->local_io_capability; iocap[1] = p_cb->loc_oob_flag; iocap[2] = p_cb->loc_auth_req; } /******************************************************************************* * Function smp_collect_peer_io_capabilities * * Description This function puts into IOcap array peer device * IOCapability, OOB data, AuthReq. * * Returns void * ******************************************************************************/ void smp_collect_peer_io_capabilities(uint8_t* iocap, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); iocap[0] = p_cb->peer_io_caps; iocap[1] = p_cb->peer_oob_flag; iocap[2] = p_cb->peer_auth_req; } /******************************************************************************* * Function smp_collect_local_ble_address * * Description Put the the local device LE address into the le_addr array: * le_addr[0-5] = local BD ADDR, * le_addr[6] = local le address type (PUBLIC/RANDOM). * * Returns void * ******************************************************************************/ void smp_collect_local_ble_address(uint8_t* le_addr, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { tBLE_ADDR_TYPE addr_type = BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC; RawAddress bda; uint8_t* p = le_addr; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); BTM_ReadConnectionAddr(p_cb->pairing_bda, bda, &addr_type); BDADDR_TO_STREAM(p, bda); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, addr_type); } /******************************************************************************* * Function smp_collect_peer_ble_address * * Description Put the peer device LE addr into the le_addr array: * le_addr[0-5] = peer BD ADDR, * le_addr[6] = peer le address type (PUBLIC/RANDOM). * * Returns void * ******************************************************************************/ void smp_collect_peer_ble_address(uint8_t* le_addr, tSMP_CB* p_cb) { tBLE_ADDR_TYPE addr_type = BLE_ADDR_PUBLIC; RawAddress bda; uint8_t* p = le_addr; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); if (!BTM_ReadRemoteConnectionAddr(p_cb->pairing_bda, bda, &addr_type)) { SMP_TRACE_ERROR( "can not collect peer le addr information for unknown device"); return; } BDADDR_TO_STREAM(p, bda); UINT8_TO_STREAM(p, addr_type); } /******************************************************************************* * Function smp_check_commitment * * Description This function compares peer commitment values: * - expected (i.e. calculated locally), * - received from the peer. * * Returns true if the values are the same * false otherwise * ******************************************************************************/ bool smp_check_commitment(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); Octet16 expected = smp_calculate_peer_commitment(p_cb); print128(expected, (const uint8_t*)"calculated peer commitment"); print128(p_cb->remote_commitment, (const uint8_t*)"received peer commitment"); if (memcmp(p_cb->remote_commitment.data(), expected.data(), OCTET16_LEN)) { SMP_TRACE_WARNING("%s: Commitment check fails", __func__); return false; } SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Commitment check succeeds", __func__); return true; } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_save_secure_connections_long_term_key * * Description The function saves SC LTK as BLE key for future use as local * and/or peer key. * * Returns void * ******************************************************************************/ void smp_save_secure_connections_long_term_key(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE lle_key; tBTM_LE_KEY_VALUE ple_key; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s-Save LTK as local LTK key", __func__); lle_key.lenc_key.ltk = p_cb->ltk; lle_key.lenc_key.div = 0; lle_key.lenc_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size; lle_key.lenc_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level; btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_LENC, &lle_key, true); SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s-Save LTK as peer LTK key", __func__); ple_key.penc_key.ediv = 0; memset(ple_key.penc_key.rand, 0, BT_OCTET8_LEN); ple_key.penc_key.ltk = p_cb->ltk; ple_key.penc_key.sec_level = p_cb->sec_level; ple_key.penc_key.key_size = p_cb->loc_enc_size; btm_sec_save_le_key(p_cb->pairing_bda, BTM_LE_KEY_PENC, &ple_key, true); } /** The function calculates MacKey and LTK and saves them in CB. To calculate * MacKey and LTK it calls smp_calc_f5(...). MacKey is used in dhkey * calculation, LTK is used to encrypt the link. */ void smp_calculate_f5_mackey_and_long_term_key(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { uint8_t a[7]; uint8_t b[7]; Octet16 na; Octet16 nb; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); if (p_cb->role == HCI_ROLE_CENTRAL) { smp_collect_local_ble_address(a, p_cb); smp_collect_peer_ble_address(b, p_cb); na = p_cb->rand; nb = p_cb->rrand; } else { smp_collect_local_ble_address(b, p_cb); smp_collect_peer_ble_address(a, p_cb); na = p_cb->rrand; nb = p_cb->rand; } crypto_toolbox::f5(p_cb->dhkey, na, nb, a, b, &p_cb->mac_key, &p_cb->ltk); SMP_TRACE_EVENT("%s is completed", __func__); } /******************************************************************************* * * Function smp_request_oob_data * * Description Requests application to provide OOB data. * * Returns true - OOB data has to be provided by application * false - otherwise (unexpected) * ******************************************************************************/ bool smp_request_oob_data(tSMP_CB* p_cb) { tSMP_OOB_DATA_TYPE req_oob_type = SMP_OOB_INVALID_TYPE; SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s", __func__); if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT && p_cb->loc_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) { /* both local and peer rcvd data OOB */ req_oob_type = SMP_OOB_BOTH; } else if (p_cb->peer_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) { /* peer rcvd OOB local data, local didn't receive OOB peer data */ req_oob_type = SMP_OOB_LOCAL; } else if (p_cb->loc_oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT) { req_oob_type = SMP_OOB_PEER; } SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("req_oob_type = %d", req_oob_type); if (req_oob_type == SMP_OOB_INVALID_TYPE) return false; p_cb->req_oob_type = req_oob_type; p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_SC_OOB_REQ_EVT; tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data; smp_int_data.req_oob_type = req_oob_type; smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_TK_REQ_EVT, &smp_int_data); return true; } void print128(const Octet16& x, const uint8_t* key_name) { if (VLOG_IS_ON(2) && DLOG_IS_ON(INFO)) { uint8_t* p = (uint8_t*)x.data(); DVLOG(2) << key_name << " (MSB ~ LSB) = "; for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) { DVLOG(2) << +p[OCTET16_LEN - i * 4 - 1] << +p[OCTET16_LEN - i * 4 - 2] << +p[OCTET16_LEN - i * 4 - 3] << +p[OCTET16_LEN - i * 4 - 4]; } } }