# network manager type netd, domain, mlstrustedsubject; type netd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type; net_domain(netd) # in addition to ioctls allowlisted for all domains, grant netd priv_sock_ioctls. allowxperm netd self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls; r_dir_file(netd, cgroup) allow netd system_server:fd use; allow netd self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw kill }; # Note: fsetid is deliberately not included above. fsetid checks are # triggered by chmod on a directory or file owned by a group other # than one of the groups assigned to the current process to see if # the setgid bit should be cleared, regardless of whether the setgid # bit was even set. We do not appear to truly need this capability # for netd to operate. dontaudit netd self:global_capability_class_set fsetid; # Allow netd to open /dev/tun, set it up and pass it to clatd allow netd tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms; allowxperm netd tun_device:chr_file ioctl { TUNGETIFF TUNSETIFF }; allow netd self:tun_socket create; allow netd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; allow netd self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write; allow netd self:netlink_nflog_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; allow netd self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; allow netd self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read nlmsg_write }; allow netd self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; allow netd self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl; allow netd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms; allow netd system_file:file x_file_perms; not_full_treble(`allow netd vendor_file:file x_file_perms;') allow netd devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms; # Acquire advisory lock on /system/etc/xtables.lock. If this file doesn't # exist, suppress the denial. allow netd system_file:file lock; dontaudit netd system_file:dir write; # Allow netd to write to qtaguid ctrl file. # TODO: Add proper rules to prevent other process to access qtaguid_proc file # after migration complete allow netd proc_qtaguid_ctrl:file rw_file_perms; # Allow netd to read /dev/qtaguid. This is the same privilege level that normal apps have. allow netd qtaguid_device:chr_file r_file_perms; r_dir_file(netd, proc_net_type) # For /proc/sys/net/ipv[46]/route/flush. allow netd proc_net_type:file rw_file_perms; # Enables PppController and interface enumeration (among others) allow netd sysfs:dir r_dir_perms; r_dir_file(netd, sysfs_net) # Allows setting interface MTU allow netd sysfs_net:file w_file_perms; # TODO: added to match above sysfs rule. Remove me? allow netd sysfs_usb:file write; r_dir_file(netd, cgroup_v2) allow netd fs_bpf:dir search; allow netd fs_bpf:file { read write }; # TODO: netd previously thought it needed these permissions to do WiFi related # work. However, after all the WiFi stuff is gone, we still need them. # Why? allow netd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search chown }; # Needed to update /data/misc/net/rt_tables allow netd net_data_file:file create_file_perms; allow netd net_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms; allow netd self:global_capability_class_set fowner; # Needed to lock the iptables lock. allow netd system_file:file lock; # Allow netd to spawn dnsmasq in it's own domain allow netd dnsmasq:process signal; # Allow netd to publish a binder service and make binder calls. binder_use(netd) add_service(netd, netd_service) add_service(netd, dnsresolver_service) allow netd dumpstate:fifo_file { getattr write }; # Allow netd to call into the system server so it can check permissions. allow netd system_server:binder call; allow netd permission_service:service_manager find; # Allow netd to talk to the framework service which collects netd events. allow netd netd_listener_service:service_manager find; # Allow netd to operate on sockets that are passed to it. allow netd netdomain:{ icmp_socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket tun_socket } { read write getattr setattr getopt setopt }; allow netd netdomain:fd use; # give netd permission to read and write netlink xfrm allow netd self:netlink_xfrm_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_write nlmsg_read }; # Allow netd to register as hal server. add_hwservice(netd, system_net_netd_hwservice) hwbinder_use(netd) ### ### Neverallow rules ### ### netd should NEVER do any of this # Block device access. neverallow netd dev_type:blk_file { read write }; # ptrace any other app neverallow netd { domain }:process ptrace; # Write to /system. neverallow netd system_file:dir_file_class_set write; # Write to files in /data/data or system files on /data neverallow netd { app_data_file_type system_data_file }:dir_file_class_set write; # only system_server, dumpstate and network stack app may find netd service neverallow { domain -system_server -dumpstate -network_stack -netd -netutils_wrapper } netd_service:service_manager find; # only system_server, dumpstate and network stack app may find dnsresolver service neverallow { domain -system_server -dumpstate -network_stack -netd -netutils_wrapper } dnsresolver_service:service_manager find; # apps may not interact with netd over binder. neverallow { appdomain -network_stack } netd:binder call; neverallow netd { appdomain -network_stack userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:binder call; # If an already existing file is opened with O_CREATE, the kernel might generate # a false report of a create denial. Silence these denials and make sure that # inappropriate permissions are not granted. neverallow netd proc_net:dir no_w_dir_perms; dontaudit netd proc_net:dir write; neverallow netd sysfs_net:dir no_w_dir_perms; dontaudit netd sysfs_net:dir write; # Netd should not have SYS_ADMIN privs. neverallow netd self:capability sys_admin; dontaudit netd self:capability sys_admin; # HUANGLONG begin allow netd self:capability2 bpf; # HUANGLONG end # Netd should not have SYS_MODULE privs, nor should it be requesting module loads # (things it requires should be built directly into the kernel) dontaudit netd self:capability sys_module; dontaudit netd kernel:system module_request; dontaudit netd appdomain:unix_stream_socket { read write };