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256 lines
7.9 KiB
256 lines
7.9 KiB
# Domain for shell processes spawned by ADB or console service.
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type shell, domain, mlstrustedsubject;
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type shell_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
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# Create and use network sockets.
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net_domain(shell)
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# logcat
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read_logd(shell)
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control_logd(shell)
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# logcat -L (directly, or via dumpstate)
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allow shell pstorefs:dir search;
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allow shell pstorefs:file r_file_perms;
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# Root fs.
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allow shell rootfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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# read files in /data/anr
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allow shell anr_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow shell anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Access /data/local/tmp.
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allow shell shell_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow shell shell_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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allow shell shell_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
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allow shell shell_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
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# Read and delete from /data/local/traces.
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allow shell trace_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
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allow shell trace_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms remove_name write };
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# Access /data/misc/profman.
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allow shell profman_dump_data_file:dir { write remove_name r_dir_perms };
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allow shell profman_dump_data_file:file { unlink r_file_perms };
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# Read/execute files in /data/nativetest
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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allow shell nativetest_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow shell nativetest_data_file:file rx_file_perms;
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')
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# adb bugreport
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unix_socket_connect(shell, dumpstate, dumpstate)
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allow shell devpts:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow shell tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow shell console_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow shell input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow shell input_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(shell, system_file)
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allow shell system_file:file x_file_perms;
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allow shell toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow shell tzdatacheck_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow shell shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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allow shell zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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r_dir_file(shell, apk_data_file)
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# Set properties.
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set_prop(shell, shell_prop)
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set_prop(shell, ctl_bugreport_prop)
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set_prop(shell, ctl_dumpstate_prop)
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set_prop(shell, dumpstate_prop)
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set_prop(shell, exported_dumpstate_prop)
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set_prop(shell, debug_prop)
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set_prop(shell, powerctl_prop)
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set_prop(shell, log_tag_prop)
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set_prop(shell, wifi_log_prop)
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# Allow shell to start/stop traced via the persist.traced.enable
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# property (which also takes care of /data/misc initialization).
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set_prop(shell, traced_enabled_prop)
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# adjust is_loggable properties
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userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, log_prop)')
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# logpersist script
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userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(shell, logpersistd_logging_prop)')
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# Allow shell to start/stop heapprofd via the persist.heapprofd.enable
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# property.
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set_prop(shell, heapprofd_enabled_prop)
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# Allow shell to start/stop gsid via ctl.start|stop|restart gsid.
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set_prop(shell, ctl_gsid_prop)
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# Allow shell to enable Dynamic System Update
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set_prop(shell, dynamic_system_prop)
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userdebug_or_eng(`
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# "systrace --boot" support - allow boottrace service to run
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allow shell boottrace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow shell boottrace_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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set_prop(shell, persist_debug_prop)
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')
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# Read device's serial number from system properties
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get_prop(shell, serialno_prop)
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# Allow shell to read the vendor security patch level for CTS
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get_prop(shell, vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
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# Read state of logging-related properties
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get_prop(shell, device_logging_prop)
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# Read state of boot reason properties
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get_prop(shell, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
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get_prop(shell, last_boot_reason_prop)
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get_prop(shell, system_boot_reason_prop)
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# allow shell access to services
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allow shell servicemanager:service_manager list;
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# don't allow shell to access GateKeeper service
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# TODO: why is this so broad? Tightening candidate? It needs at list:
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# - dumpstate_service (so it can receive dumpstate progress updates)
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allow shell {
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service_manager_type
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-apex_service
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-dnsresolver_service
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-gatekeeper_service
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-incident_service
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-installd_service
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-iorapd_service
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-netd_service
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-system_suspend_control_service
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-virtual_touchpad_service
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-vold_service
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-vr_hwc_service
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}:service_manager find;
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allow shell dumpstate:binder call;
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# allow shell to get information from hwservicemanager
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# for instance, listing hardware services with lshal
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hwbinder_use(shell)
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allow shell hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;
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# allow shell to look through /proc/ for lsmod, ps, top, netstat.
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r_dir_file(shell, proc_net_type)
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allow shell {
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proc_asound
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proc_filesystems
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proc_interrupts
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proc_loadavg # b/124024827
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proc_meminfo
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proc_modules
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proc_pid_max
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proc_slabinfo
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proc_stat
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proc_timer
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proc_uptime
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proc_version
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proc_zoneinfo
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}:file r_file_perms;
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# allow listing network interfaces under /sys/class/net.
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allow shell sysfs_net:dir r_dir_perms;
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r_dir_file(shell, cgroup)
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allow shell domain:dir { search open read getattr };
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allow shell domain:{ file lnk_file } { open read getattr };
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# statvfs() of /proc and other labeled filesystems
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# (yaffs2, jffs2, ext2, ext3, ext4, xfs, btrfs, f2fs, squashfs, overlay)
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allow shell { proc labeledfs }:filesystem getattr;
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# stat() of /dev
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allow shell device:dir getattr;
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# allow shell to read /proc/pid/attr/current for ps -Z
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allow shell domain:process getattr;
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# Allow pulling the SELinux policy for CTS purposes
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allow shell selinuxfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow shell selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
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# enable shell domain to read/write files/dirs for bootchart data
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# User will creates the start and stop file via adb shell
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# and read other files created by init process under /data/bootchart
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allow shell bootchart_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow shell bootchart_data_file:file create_file_perms;
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# Make sure strace works for the non-privileged shell user
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allow shell self:process ptrace;
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# allow shell to get battery info
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allow shell sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow shell sysfs_batteryinfo:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow shell sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms;
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# Allow access to ion memory allocation device.
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allow shell ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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#
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# filesystem test for insecure chr_file's is done
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# via a host side test
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#
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allow shell dev_type:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow shell dev_type:chr_file getattr;
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# /dev/fd is a symlink
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allow shell proc:lnk_file getattr;
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#
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# filesystem test for insucre blk_file's is done
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# via hostside test
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#
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allow shell dev_type:blk_file getattr;
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# read selinux policy files
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allow shell file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow shell property_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow shell seapp_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow shell service_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
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allow shell sepolicy_file:file r_file_perms;
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# Allow shell to start up vendor shell
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allow shell vendor_shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
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# Everything is labeled as rootfs in recovery mode. Allow shell to
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# execute them.
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recovery_only(`
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allow shell rootfs:file rx_file_perms;
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')
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###
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### Neverallow rules
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###
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# Do not allow shell to hard link to any files.
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# In particular, if shell hard links to app data
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# files, installd will not be able to guarantee the deletion
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# of the linked to file. Hard links also contribute to security
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# bugs, so we want to ensure the shell user never has this
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# capability.
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neverallow shell file_type:file link;
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# Do not allow privileged socket ioctl commands
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neverallowxperm shell domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket } ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
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# limit shell access to sensitive char drivers to
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# only getattr required for host side test.
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neverallow shell {
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fuse_device
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hw_random_device
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port_device
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}:chr_file ~getattr;
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# Limit shell to only getattr on blk devices for host side tests.
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neverallow shell dev_type:blk_file ~getattr;
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# b/30861057: Shell access to existing input devices is an abuse
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# vector. The shell user can inject events that look like they
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# originate from the touchscreen etc.
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# Everyone should have already moved to UiAutomation#injectInputEvent
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# if they are running instrumentation tests (i.e. CTS), Monkey for
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# their stress tests, and the input command (adb shell input ...) for
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# injecting swipes and things.
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neverallow shell input_device:chr_file no_w_file_perms;
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