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ECDH

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##ECDH description: See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elliptic_curve_Diffie%E2%80%93Hellman

##Bugs Some libraries do not check if the elliptic curve points received from another party are points on the curve. Encodings of public keys typically contain the curve for the public key point. If such an encoding is used in the key exchange then it is important to check that the public and secret key used to compute the shared ECDH secret are using the same curve. Some libraries fail to do this check.

Potential exploits: The damage done depends on the protocol that uses ECDH. E.g. if ECDH is used with ephemeral keys then the damage is typically limited. If the EC keys are static, i.e. used for multiple key exchanges then a failure to verify a public point can disclose the private key used in the same protocol. (To do: add papers describing the attack).

##Libraries Sun JCE provider: ECDH does not check if the points are on the curve. The implementer must do this.

Bouncycastle: The ECDH implementation does not check if the point is on the curve. Furthermore, Bouncycastle does not even check if the public and private key are on the same curve. It performs a point multiplication \(x \cdot Y\) over the curve specified by the public key.

OpenSSL: Point verification is done in OpenSSL if the right functions are used. Since OpenSSL is not well documented it is a bit tricky to find the right functions. (To do: maybe add an example).

##Countermeasures TODO:

  • use point compression. Formats such as X509EncodedKeySpec in Java include bits that indicate whether the point is compressed or not. Hence an attacker can always choose to use uncompressed points as long as this option is incorrectly implemented.
  • check that public and private key use the same curve
  • restrict the protocol to named curves
  • reconstruct the public key explicitly using the parameters of the private key.

Further recommendations: If possible I also check if the points are on the curve after point multiplications on an elliptic curve in the hope to catch implementation and hardware faults.

Some notable bugs:

  • ECDHC in bouncy castle could be broken by modifying the order of the public key.